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GOES I-M: A RETROSPECTIVE LOOK AT IMAGE NAVIGATION 
AND REGISTRATION (INR), JITTER AND LESSONS LEARNED 
John Sudey, Jr.,* Michael Hagopian,† and Cornelius Dennehy‡ 
The Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite (GOES) I-M series of 
spacecraft was the second generation of United States meteorological observa-
tional platforms in geosynchronous orbit. They served as the principal Earth-
viewing observational platforms for continuously monitoring dynamic weather 
events from the mid-1990s and into the 21st century. This paper will look back 
at the program framing key system attributes of the mission, which necessitated 
a multi-layered development approach to meet stringent meteorological instru-
ment Line-of-Sight (LoS) pointing and pointing stability requirements. The 
overall approach involved understanding, correcting, and avoiding pointing er-
rors across a broad frequency range including what would typically be called 
dynamic interaction and jitter. Background information will be provided cover-
ing the mission architecture and program drivers. The systems solution for man-
aging and mitigating the deleterious influences of on-board disturbances in order 
to meet the challenging instrument LoS pointing and jitter requirements will be 
described, along with the ‘first of its kind’ Image Navigation and Registration 
system. A broad look back at the lessons learned that emerged from the GOES I-
M experience will be presented, with the intent of capturing general and specific 
insights for developers of future missions having stringent payload instrument 
pointing requirements. These discussions will touch on such critical aspects as 
defining jitter and related pointing requirements, the importance of early system 
architectural decisions, understanding and reducing on-board disturbances, the 
balance of test and analysis, and the imperative for maximizing on-orbit opera-
tional flexibility in order to accommodate unexpected dynamic interactions. 
INTRODUCTION 
Motivation and Outline 
In the formulation of next generation of National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) Space- and Earth-science missions, there is a constant trend to push towards higher per-
forming spacecraft and instruments. This often manifests itself in increasingly demanding re-
quirements for science/observational instrument Line-of-Sight (LoS) pointing accuracy and sta-
bility. It is well known that understanding and verifying spacecraft instrument LoS motion due to 
environmental effects and on-board disturbance sources is a challenging, multi-disciplinary sys-
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tems engineering problem, especially for those observatories with stringent pointing require-
ments.  
In the view of the authors, there is a scarcity within the spaceflight community of well-
established and published guidelines highlighting uniform practices for the process of assessing, 
controlling, and managing observatory pointing stability and jitter. In fact, the term “jitter” is not 
well-defined, and there is currently no existing Agency-level set of established best practices for 
performing observatory jitter analysis and test. While several organizations at the NASA Centers 
have their own in-house approaches, the degree to which these are fully informed by past experi-
ence, documented relative to mission architecture and performance requirements, and shared 
across the Agency is limited. Documenting these best practices for developing and verify-
ing/validating jitter performance, in a manner that both advances the state-of-art and broadly sup-
ports the full mission lifecycle, is a goal of the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) 
Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) Technical Discipline Team (TDT). The NESC 
GN&C TDT is chartered to perform such GN&C discipline knowledge capture work in support 
of NASA’s goals for retaining and sharing Agency-wide, highly-specialized engineering ‘tribal 
knowledge.’1  
Furthermore, the NESC GN&C TDT is interested in capturing relevant lessons learned from 
past missions that have dealt with the spacecraft jitter problem. Towards that end, there are some 
retired jitter “greybeards” still around with important project experiences that must be document-
ed and shared. While the co-authors of this paper are still actively supporting many of today’s 
missions with challenging jitter requirements, their experience includes early NASA pro-
jects/programs such as Landsat, Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite (GOES) and 
Hubble Space Telescope (HST). At that time, analysis tools were less capable than today, and 
jitter performance had to be largely verified by test. The GOES I-M Program was chosen for this 
paper given its incremental test approach at component, subsystem and system level, and the 
wealth of on-orbit data that link the ground test program to flight performance. In addition, the 
project’s evolution within GOES I-M, and the program’s evolution from GOES I-M to GOES N, 
and to the current GOES R series, offers a unique perspective on lessons learned and architectural 
changes made to steadily improve performance. 
The challenges of meeting stringent pointing stability/jitter requirements are well reflected in 
the experience of designing and developing the GOES I-M series of meteorological observatories. 
This paper will summarize a recent knowledge capture activity of the NESC GN&C TDT to take 
a broad look back at the program:  
 Framing key mission drivers and challenges; 
 Describing the Image Navigation and Registration (INR) system and sources of instrument 
LoS pointing error;  
 Defining “jitter” in the broader context of pointing error;  
 Sharing the jitter approach used to understand the observatory dynamic environment and mit-
igate pointing error;  
 Presenting a variety of lessons learned of that jitter approach,  
 Presenting efficacy of the chosen architecture and test/analysis program;  
 Initiating a discussion on jitter performance improvements with GOES program evolution. 
GOES I-M Background 
The prior two generations of GOES missions, GOES 1-7, used spin-stabilized platforms with 
instruments that viewed Earth only 10 percent of the time. The last generation had both an imager 
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and sounder, but their operation was sequential as they shared common front-end optics. While 
there was heritage with this type of platform, and spinner advantages with large gyroscopic stiff-
ness and reduced thermal transient effects, the low observational duty cycle severely limited ob-
servation of weather dynamics. Images were collected at a fixed-frame rate, with one third of the 
Earth transmitted every 20 minutes, and those images were not registered to a fixed grid on the 
Earth. 
The GOES I-M Project was formulated to improve observational performance in terms of 
measurement capability, duty cycle, and distribution of registered data.2 This would allow dy-
namic weather events to be characterized and tracked for public safety. More specifically, the 
mission was required to: continuously observe and measure meteorological phenomena in real 
time; provide the meteorological community and the atmospheric scientist greatly improved ob-
servational and measurement data; collect data more frequently including the evolution of atmos-
pheric phenomena and real-time coverage of short-lived dynamic events, especially severe local 
storms and tropical cyclones; and register images to a grid of assigned geographic boundaries for 
distribution in near real-time (<30 minutes after observation).  
These GOES I-M mission drivers and requirements challenged the state of the art. They re-
quired a 3-axis body-stabilized platform capable of precisely and continuously pointing the opti-
cal LoS of the instruments to the Earth. The payload would include separate Imager and Sounder 
instruments, which could be operated simultaneously, with tight pointing accuracy and stability 
requirements. Furthermore, the instruments had flexible scan areas, and could repeatedly scan the 
same area (frame) to make movies. This architecture was challenged by a variety of disturbance 
sources perturbing a less stiff control system, and the heightened effect of larger temperature gra-
dients and day/night transitions on thermal distortion and snap. In order to meet the near real time 
distribution of geolocated imagery requirement; image motions had to be corrected at the 
sourcethe instrument scan mirrors. In addition, there were other programmatic constraints 
aimed at reducing technical/schedule cost and risk. GOES I-M was to leverage off the geosyn-
chronous communications satellite industry, which was already deploying and operating 3-axis 
body-stabilized platforms in geosynchronous orbit. The program wanted to expedite the first two 
observatories to allow full coverage of Earth’s western hemisphere, so the program decided to 
minimize overall risk by fully interrogating the system during the first build and through system 
test, launch, commissioning, and on-orbit operation. The fact that the GOES pointing require-
ments exceeded existing geosynchronous communication satellite industry performance, and that 
many of those differences were not fully appreciated until after the initial spacecraft of the series, 
GOES-8, was already operational, will be highlighted in this paper. 
The GOES I-M satellites were designed and built by Space Systems/Loral (SS/L) for NASA/ 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), with the Imager and Sounder In-
struments both built by ITT Aerospace/Communications Division. With the launch of GOES-I in 
April of 1994 (which was re-named as GOES-8 once it became operational) the GOES I-M series 
of spacecraft served as the principal Earth-viewing observational platforms for continuously mon-
itoring dynamic weather events from the mid-1990s and into the 21st century. GOES-8 was re-
tired by NOAA after 10 years of service in May of 2004.   
The GOES I-M spacecraft design was similar to SS/L’s Indian National Satellite System 
(INSAT) project, with a modular bus (based on SS/L’s FS-1300 platform), an asymmetric Solar 
Array/Solar Sail configuration, and a similar Attitude Control System (ACS). The satellite con-
sisted of a central body containing all the propulsion and electronic equipment, providing a plat-
form on which the Imager and Sounder instruments were mounted on the Nadir facing deck 
alongside the Earth Sensor (ES). The spacecraft attitude was maintained and controlled (about 
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0.08 Hz bandwidth) with respect to the Earth by means of the ES, which provides the pointing 
reference, and a momentum-bias system with two skewed Momentum Wheels (MWs) for pitch 
and roll control (V-mode). The yaw Reaction Wheel (RW) could be used as a redundant backup 
in conjunction with either MW (L-mode). A solar array continuously rotated about the satellite 
pitch axis to track the Sun during the orbital motion. The asymmetric configuration avoided solar 
input into the passive coolers by using a conical-shaped solar sail to balance the torque caused by 
solar radiation pressure. For each instrument, the scan mirror was mounted on a two-axis gimbal 
with orthogonal scan axes along the east/west and north/south directions. The scan was servo-
controlled through a high bandwidth (about 30 Hz) precision system.  
The Image Navigation & Registration (INR) System 
The GOES I-M INR system was developed and patented by SS/L to meet the pointing re-
quirements of the instrument payload.3 The INR system enabled GOES to provide and maintain 
the geographical location of Imager and Sounder data with a high degree of accuracy in near real-
time by removing the apparent image-to-image motion resulting from orbital motion, determinis-
tic satellite attitude deviations, and satellite thermal distortions. It did this by continuously steer-
ing the instrument scan mirrors to compensate for this motion. To enable this system, the instru-
ments were capable of star sensing. The Imager (primary instrument and focus of this paper) used 
its visible channel detectors, with boosted gain and reduced bandwidth, to detect as dim as B0-
class fourth magnitude stars.  
The Imager INR requirements are shown in Table 1. Image navigation was the process of de-
termining the location of any pixel within an image in terms of Earth longitude and latitude, so 
image navigation was a measure of absolute pointing accuracy. Image registration referred to the 
process of keeping any pixel within an image pointed to its nominal Earth location within speci-
fied accuracy, so image registration was a measure of pointing stability.  
Table 1. GOES I-M Imager INR Requirements. 
 
The INR system corrected for the apparent image-to-image motion resulting from orbital and 
deterministic attitude errors. The mission was specified to stay within 0.5° inclination about the 
equator and ±0.5° of the on-station longitude, which required periodic station keeping. The image 
pointing error at the edge of this inclination box was as high as 1550 µrad (micro-radian), which 
is significant compared to the INR requirements. Instrument scanner motion during large slews 
resulted in rigid body motion of the spacecraft in excess of the Registration requirements. While 
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the ES and Imager were both located on the Earth facing deck, the mounting interface was not a 
stable, and their boresights moved relative to each other as a function of temperature. The magni-
tude of the thermal LoS error was also large compared to INR requirements. 
Compensation signals were generated in the attitude and orbit control system and transmitted 
to the satellite, nominally once each day. The INR system was divided into space segment and 
ground segment and was predicated on the expectation that errors would be correctable on a 24-
hour, daily cycle and remain stable from day to day. The space segment consisted of the Image 
Motion Compensation (IMC) system that compensated for errors caused by orbit and attitude mo-
tions, and the Mirror Motion Compensation (MMC) system that compensated for spacecraft atti-
tude motion caused by Imager and Sounder scan mirror slews to Black Body (BB). The ground 
segment consisted mainly of the Orbit & Attitude Tracking System (OATS) that determined the 
IMC orbit and attitude coefficients from star, landmark, and range measurements. In addition, 
other compensation signals were determined prior to flight and stored in Programmable Read On-
ly Memory (PROM) on-board the spacecraft to correct Fixed Pattern Errors (FPE) in the instru-
ment’s inductosyn sensor and drive.  
At a system level, compensation of diurnal orbit and attitude errors applied to the instrument 
servo by the INR system would have residual errors due to unpredictable variations in Earth's 
magnetic field, IMC/MMC processing (sensing, generation, and application) errors, and instru-
ment IMC/MMC track errors. At a spacecraft level, there would be ACS pointing control errors 
due to ES linearity and noise; MW tachometer noise; dynamic interactions with disturbances 
from rotating mechanisms on the spacecraft such as MWs, RWs, instrument cryogenic coolers, 
instrument scan mirrors, and the solar array drive; and both rigid and non-rigid body structural 
vibrations including flexible spacecraft components such as the solar array, solar sail, and other 
booms. Analogously, at the instrument level, corrections were applied within the servos to correct 
known build imperfections including FPE and gimbal orthogonality over temperature and life, as 
well as detector co-registration and timing errors. There would also be instrument servo control 
stability errors due to inductosyn sensor noise (e.g., crosstalk), and dynamic interactions with in-
strument non-rigid body modes. 
Jitter Definition and Specification 
While there is no universally accepted “jitter” definition, a quick search on the web highlights 
some attributes and consensus views that:  
 Jitter is due to vibrations, which are induced in spacecraft by a number of disturbance sources 
such as MWs, RWs, solar array drive assemblies, instrument cryogenic coolers, and instru-
ment scan mirrors; 
 Jitter refers to a sinusoidal motion during the instrument’s integration/exposure time; 
 Jitter is usually considered medium to high frequency in nature relative to the ACS band-
width;  
 Jitter is usually defined over a time period(s) associated with an integration time requirement;  
 Jitter is sometimes defined as any pointing error that is beyond the control bandwidth of the 
ACS;  
 Jitter is often differentiated from smear, which has a lower frequency and can be relatively 
constant over the integration time. 
Project approaches to specify jitter vary based on overall pointing requirement specification 
and system architecture; particularly when there are multiple control loops at play, a diversity of 
disturbance sources on the bus and within the payload, pointing correction schemes, etc. Project 
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jitter requirements, as in GOES I-M, are often levied within a pointing stability budget that in-
cludes other “jitter-like” errors associated with named subsystem/component interactions. This 
construct is driven, in part, to reflect developmental responsibility (organization or subsystem) 
and verification approach. For GOES I-M, jitter budgets are allocated as a catchall for unspecified 
sources/responses, with some overlap (open to interpretation) to other specifically named pointing 
stability errors that represent known implementation susceptibilities. 
GOES I-M “jitter” and other budgeted pointing errors are driven by and related to INR re-
quirements, but a direct mapping to all imaging time periods is not clearly evident with currently 
available documentation. Imager INR requirements during imaging specify Frame-to-Frame Reg-
istration (FFR) over periods of 15 min, 90 min, 24 and 48 hours; and With-In-Frame Registration 
(WIFR) over a period of 25 minutes. Pointing accuracy and stability requirements, including jitter 
requirements, were captured in Navigation and Registration pointing budgets.4 These GOES I-M 
pointing budgets were generated to include both short (3 min) and long (25 min) term allocations, 
covering a variety of uncompensated and compensated (residual) errors related to system imple-
mentation, build imperfections, environmental (e.g., diurnal) effects, and operational compatibil-
ity (e.g., dynamic interaction). The short-term duration was tied to the nutation period, and the 
long-term period to the WIFR. Among other allocations, the short-term budget included: ACS 
stability due to ES noise (28 µradians); Dynamic Interaction allocations (each about 5 µradians) 
for rigid body platform motion due to Solar Array (SA) stepping and Scan Mirror Motion, non-
rigid body motion due to flexible appendage excitation, and platform motion due to MW imbal-
ance; and a “jitter/noise” allocation (2 µradians) sub-allocated as a “imager pointing” error. The 
imager pointing/jitter specification was not clearly defined, as there was no identification of jitter 
frequency range, disturbance profile (e.g., sinusoidal), or source (e.g., MW). In addition, there 
was no clarification of the frequency dependent relationship between imager pointing error and 
platform motion pointing error allocations, or the rationale for root sum squaring them into an 
overall short-term pointing error. 
So how was “jitter” evaluated for GOES alongside other specifically named and budgeted 
pointing errors? Compliance to the pointing requirements was verified by test and analysis. At a 
systems level, both Dynamic Interaction Diagnostic (DID) Angular Displacement Sensor (ADS) 
data and Imager Servo Error data were each individually evaluated against a 5-µrad (1-sigma) 
jitter specification from a single momentum wheel at any time. The DID data measured the plat-
form motion at the Imager mounting interface, and included: Digital Integrating Rate Assembly 
(DIRA) from near zero-frequency to 15 Hz, ADS from 0.2 to 200 Hz (corrected down to 
0.08 Hz), and high-rate instrument servo error. There was no project direction of how to combine 
DID and Servo Error data to get a systems picture of instrument LoS stability. One would expect 
the instrument servo to track the platform motion over its control bandwidth (30 Hz), resulting in 
little servo error; to partially track platform motion beyond its control bandwidth, resulting in 
some servo error depending on frequency; and to amplify platform motion when there is local 
instrument excitation, resulting in higher servo error. Low-frequency corrected ADS data were 
also used to evaluate a variety of other “jitter-like” platform motion pointing errors, including 
from solar array stepping and scan mirror motion. While jitter was specifically evaluated with 
respect to MW interaction, it was always understood in a broader context to include all period-
ic/sinusoidal disturbances affecting instrument LoS.  
For GOES I-M, and in general, jitter can be understood as an instrument LoS pointing stability 
error that includes some combination of ACS error, spacecraft platform motion, instrument servo 
error, and instrument structure motion. It could be defined as follows:  
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“Jitter includes all short-term platform pointing errors (typically sinusoidal, at or beyond the 
ACS bandwidth) at the instrument mounting interface; both from direct interactions (rigid and 
non-rigid body) with vibrating components, and from sensor noise induced ACS control error 
that effectively become “ACS platform disturbances.” In addition to platform motion at the 
mounting interface, jitter also includes instrument pointing errors (typically sinusoidal, at or be-
yond the instrument servo bandwidth) relative to the platform; both from local instrument struc-
tural (non-rigid body) interactions, and from sensor noise-induced instrument servo control er-
ror.”  
A notional diagram explaining “jitter” in the context overall pointing, was generated by John 
Sudey, Jr. and used on multiple NASA projects, is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Notional Jitter Diagram. 
Pointing Error/Jitter, Approach and Select Highlights 
The GOES I-M four element approach for understanding and minimizing pointing error and 
jitter was to “Understand Behavior, Minimize Pointing Error by Design, Correct for Deterministic 
Effects, Provide Operational Flexibility & Constrain Operationally.” This approach was pursued 
with analysis and test at component, subsystem and system levels early enough to allow for de-
sign changes and operational tweaks. It also reflected the methodology at the time of project for-
mulation, which put a premium on identifying/understanding specific pointing threats and cor-
recting for them, versus active correction schemes for a range of disturbance sources. 
Key to this approach, was to understand “cause and effect” with respect to LoS pointing.2 The 
project worked to build a systems view of the dynamic environment through analysis and instru-
mented test. Figure 2, iullustrates this overall dynamic environment. Note, however, the space-
craft control bandwidth should be 0.08 Hz and not the value represented in Figure 2. The project 
performed multiple component/subsystem tests including: Kistler table disturbance testing; FEM 
modeling to understand structural rigid and flexible modes; modal tests to obtain transfer func-
tions to the instrument mount in order to understand instrument pointing. Multiple analyses were 
also performed including: Structures-Thermal-Optical-Power (STOP) analysis; piecewise jitter 
analysis; and instrument disturbance rejection analysis. The project also performed detailed anal-
yses and tests to characterize the instrument servos including: servo error spectrum testing; actua-
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tor and flex harness torque profile testing; inductosyn noise testing; Bode stability margin trend-
ing over temperature; and dynamic gain/phase margin testing while scanning the instruments. The 
project performed increasingly higher fidelity system tests including instrument Dynamic Interac-
tion (DI), observatory DI, DI with instrument aperture illumination using both the Multi Wedge 
Collimator (MWC) and the Wide Field Collimator (WFC), long duration stability tests, and oper-
ational scenario tests.  
This work led to multiple early design changes to minimize pointing error and jitter. While the 
INR system’s IMC and MMC corrected for other significant deterministic effects on-orbit other 
instrument deterministic corrections, determined prior to launch, were separately applied for in-
ductosyn FPE, gimbal orthogonality, and detector registration errors. The project implemented 
systems to provide some level of operational flexibility with selectable Solar Array Drive Assem-
bly (SADA) step modes, and an on-orbit ability to tweak/tune INR correction schemes based on 
DID data. DID analysis, including 3D AFT (Amplitude, Frequency, Time) plots, also allowed the 
identification of interactions towards the development of operational constraints (e.g., MW speed 
range to avoid ES galvanometer, and instrument structure interactions). One cannot overstate the 
importance of the DID system, which was flown on two of the GOES spacecraft (GOES-8 and 
10), and provided measurement of attitude motions from near zero to 300 Hz on a dedicated Mul-
tiuse Data Link (MDL). This capability was needed to understand dynamic interaction/jitter per-
formance during development, throughout integration and test, and on orbit. It answered the of-
ten-cited refrain that “Engineers Need Data Too,” and fostered a healthy culture of engineering 
curiosity. 
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Figure 2. GOES I-M Spacecraft Dynamic Environment. 
The following example of DI testing illustrated how the comprehensive, incremental test pro-
gram supported the overall jitter approach, and informed early design changes and operational 
constraints. Tests were first run to understand and minimize MW disturbance profiles. The GOES 
TELDIX® MWs (51 N-m-s) were selected because they were considered quieter than those from 
the competition, but early vendor characterization tests showed too much MW dynamic and static 
imbalance, so the wheels were rebalanced. When retested on a Kistler table, the wheels were still 
noisy, so they were rebalanced again. Subsequent retest confirmed quiet wheels with 5x reduction 
in dynamic imbalance and 2x reduction in static imbalance. The wheels were later mounted into a 
flight configuration and run in a DI test where mount interactions were noted at high speeds (from 
80-100 Hz). Subsequently, the mount was stiffened and retest showed a quieter assembly of 
MWs. DI testing was then continued with the operation of the Imager scan mechanism. This early 
disturbance rejection testing, with the instrument on a shaker and suspended, found a local excita-
tion of a scan mirror support plate above 80 Hz. So, the support plate was stiffened. While a retest 
showed improvement, it was decided to add constraints on high-speed MW operation. The MW 
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speed range was changed to span 2900 to 4500 Revolutions per Minute (RPM). A spacecraft level 
DI test was then run, which confirmed MW-induced disturbance levels at the instrument mount-
ing interfaces were acceptable. High-speed MW (beyond the established speed constraints) tests 
were also run and confirmed earlier instrument mount interactions, and found a new high-Q (ap-
prox. 2000) ES galvanometer interaction. This further supported the MW speed range constraints. 
The project then ran a DI test in the Thermal Vacuum (TVAC) chamber with the spacecraft sus-
pended, and while jitter levels were slightly elevated, they still met specifications. The most com-
prehensive ground test followed, a fully suspended ambient observatory WFC DI test, where the 
WFC fully illuminated the Imager aperture with a test pattern while MWs were operated, and a 
host of performance (e.g., DID, servo error, image) data were collected. This test demonstrated 
pointing performance using evaluation toolsets. Surprisingly, the project still ran a high-speed 
MW test on orbit with hopes of extending the speed range and improving stiffness. However, 
consistent with the DI ground test results, that on-orbit high-speed MW test resulted in large jitter 
and ES interactions that placed the spacecraft into a Safe Hold Mode. 
Disturbance Sources: Solar Array Drive Assembly (SADA) 
Early analysis and simulation of array stepping dynamics led to a design that incorporated 
three selectable stepping profiles (Figure 3) to accommodate modal frequency uncertainty and 
reduce spacecraft jitter.5 These command sequences, Baseline and Profile, are illustrated below. 
The Baseline stepping frequency was 0.592 Hz, the value of τ was set to 0.24 seconds for Profile 
1 and 0.28 seconds for Profile 2. Note that although the disturbance magnitudes were similar, the 
harmonic content was quite different between the Baseline and Profile 2, as can be seen in 
Figure 3. 
On orbit GOES-8, 3D AFT plots (Figure 4 and Figure 5) showing ADS platform motion for 
Baseline and Profile 2 stepping operations were collected during commissioning. As expected, 
Profile 2 was quieter as it avoided spacecraft flexible body modes around 1.8 Hz, including a so-
lar sail out of plane bending mode.6 
While the SADA-induced platform motion was as expected and within specification, there 
were other unexpected errors, most significantly due to the ES,7 that were problematic. Non-
repeatability of spacecraft nadir pointing performance was a persistent source of INR error. The 
cause was isolated to variations in the Earth’s radiance near the limbs, which resulted in roll and 
pitch pointing errors that effectively became “ACS platform disturbances.” This ES behavior was 
predicted prior to launch and design changes were made to reduce its effect; however, the on-
orbit magnitude was much larger (5x) than predicted. The problem was minimized by the fre-
quent use of a Short (shorter than once per day) Span Attitude Adjust (SSAA) capability in the 
INR ground system. The maximum spacecraft attitude pointing error due to this ES Noise was 
reduced from about 300 μrad to 10 µrad with five SSAAs per day. In addition to this registration 
error, other unanticipated and significant ES non-linearities due to stray light and sun/moon intru-
sion effects led to large (totaling thousands of µrad) navigation errors. These errors (e.g., Bat-
wing, Winglets, Single Chord, Dual Chord Transition, Bevel, and Eclipse Exit) were partially 
corrected by adding the right profile to the IMC, and minimized over the life of the program with 
ES design changes. In addition to these ES errors, other thermal transient effects were unexpected 
and difficult to compensate. For example, there was a large roll error every day for 7 months of 
the year caused by shadowing of the solar sail boom which deformed until the magnetometer 
boom shadow passed by. Daily instrument thermal LoS error was larger than expected, as high as 
600 µrad relative to ES LoS, and the large day-to-day variability during eclipse season (>100 
µrad) required SSAAs. 
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Figure 3. SADA Baseline and Profile Stepping. 
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Figure 4. SADA Baseline Stepping, Platform Motion. 
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Figure 5. SADA Profile 2 Stepping, Platform Motion. 
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Retrospective Evaluation and Some Lessons Learned 
In hindsight, let’s now evaluate how well did the four element GOES I-M pointing error/jitter 
approach “Understand Behavior, Minimize Pointing Error by Design, Correct for Deterministic 
Effects, Provide Operational Flexibility & Constrain Operationally” actually work? What follows 
are GOES I-M performance hits and misses, and generally applicable lessons learned, for each 
element of the approach along with a framing of lessons learned around architecture and 
test/analysis balance. 
Understanding Behavior 
Most behavior was understood through a comprehensive test and analysis program, and what 
was tested on the ground largely performed as expected on orbit. DID instrumentation worked 
well and was an invaluable diagnostic tool used to understand interactions, tweak deterministic 
corrections, select operational modes/constraints, and debug problems. Having access to the DID 
data also allowed analysis tools and techniques developed/used by the team during ground test to 
also be utilized once the spacecraft was on-orbit. The DID should have been flown on all the 
GOES I-M missions. As expected, Sounder stepping did not lead to large Imager pointing errors, 
so that both could be operated simultaneously. Furthermore, Imager command frames did not 
have to be constrained, even CONtiguous United States (CONUS) scans that produced disturb-
ances near the magnetic boom mode. Unfortunately, some of what was not tested on the ground 
or analyzed properly, led to significant problems. The use of the Earth sensor as attitude reference 
was not based on its demonstrated ability to meet project requirements, but rather on a desire to 
leverage existing prime-contractor in-house geosynchronous communications satellite heritage. 
Specifically, selection was based on SS/L’s INSAT project, which had relatively loose pointing 
requirements (0.25° = 3600 µrad). Most of the idiosyncrasies of the ES behavior (noise, stray 
light, horizon effects, single chord, etc.) were poorly understood before launch. ACS closed-loop 
testing with ES was not possible/practical on the ground, and ES component-level tests were in-
adequate to understand behavior and support a high-fidelity systems analysis. In addition, the LoS 
motion of the instruments with respect to the ES LoS during thermal transient events was under-
estimated by analysis. General lessons learned for the “Understand Behavior” element are: 
 A successful Jitter Approach requires an understanding of the behavior both of key compo-
nents (sometimes at vendor) by test, and of systems by some combination of test/analysis 
consistent with complexity and uncertainty; 
 The most elaborate jitter systems model is susceptible to “garbage-in, garbage-out” without 
good foundational data;  
 Flying the same precision instrumentation used during ground test and characterization is 
critical for multi-mission programs, and for missions with tight jitter/pointing stability re-
quirements, as it allows trending, tweaking of operations, and debugging problems; 
 Some types of analysis (e.g., STOP and stray light) carry more uncertainty and require test 
sanity/spot checks. 
Minimize Pointing Error by Design 
Pointing stability error was minimized by early test and rework, which proved very effective. 
The MWs were balanced multiple times (including after Imager interaction testing), the MWs’ 
mounts and instrument structure were stiffened (after early characterization tests), and resulting 
jitter was shown to be below specification over a nominal operating MW speed range. MW-
induced platform and instrument jitter performed as expected on-orbit. Fortunately, the INR sys-
tem worked as designed and was flexible enough to accommodate additional corrections. This 
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included both the characterization and insertion of corrections using the IMC capability and the 
use of more frequent SSAAs, made effective by a robust instrument servo control authority, 
which allowed tracking of larger and more dynamic commands. This robustness was needed to 
compensate for unexpected ES and thermal stability errors. General lessons learned for the “Min-
imize Pointing Error by Design” element are:  
 Early tests, particularly for key components/subsystems that affect jitter/pointing stability, are 
critical as they allow for design tweaks to new systems;  
 Vendor supplied components must be properly specified including characterization require-
ments prior to delivery; 
 Stability over long periods of time is difficult to verify by test, and performance assumptions 
have to be carefully scrutinized and deemed conservative when architecting a system; 
 Thermal gradient effects are difficult to bound and comprehensively test, analysis should be 
spot checked by test; 
 Systems with tight jitter/pointing stability requirements and ground test limitations (i.e., 
boundary conditions, 1-G effects, test durations, etc.) may require additional “belt-and-
suspender” mitigations (e.g., isolation systems) based on uncertainty of interactions over life. 
Instruments should be co-located with the fundamental attitude reference sensors (e.g. gyro-
scopes and star trackers), to optimize the stability of instrument and ACS sensor boresights. 
Correct for Deterministic Effects 
Planned corrections for deterministic errors generally worked as expected. IMC correction for 
orbital effects, as large as 1550 µrad at the edges of the inclination box, worked well and led to 
only 1 µrad of servo tracking error. The IMC also corrected for diurnal, relative Instrument to ES 
LoS thermal drift. IMC correction was based on instrument star/landmark and spacecraft range 
data, which worked well. The effectiveness of the correction scheme was somewhat limited by 
the end-to-end IMC injection process which resulted in 5-µrad navigation error. The MMC cor-
rection also performed well, reducing uncompensated errors (E/W error was 150 µrad, N/S error 
was 70 µrad) down to around 4 µrad, and lower after tweaking. As expected, other scanner mo-
tion effects, including Sounder stepping, were not problematic. Instrument corrections in PROM 
worked as expected, with inductosyn FPE reduced by 4x to less than 4 µrad. As previously stated, 
the system was robust enough to allow for unplanned deterministic corrections to be made for ES 
design issues and idiosyncrasies. There were unexpected inductosyn sensor crosstalk issues (128x 
and 1x carrier), which forced the use of mechanical stops upon servo startup to avoid noise in-
duced servo error. General lessons learned for the “Correct Deterministic Effects” element are:  
 The methodology of correcting for deterministic orbital and attitude errors at the instrument 
scan mirrors is sound, but more difficult when corrections are large in comparison to the 
pointing requirements; 
 Residual errors for planned and unanticipated slowly varying errors increase as a function of 
correction cycle time; 
 Instrument servo control authority should be robust enough to allow tracking of new or unex-
pected errors; 
 Where possible, performance of key components/subsystems prone to systematic changes 
over the correction cycle should be characterized by test; 
 Active correction schemes should be applied, where deterministic corrections carry large un-
certainty (e.g., due to measurement error or design/build knowledge). 
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Provide Operational Flexibility 
Designed flexibilities and operational constraints worked well. The SADA step modes be-
haved as expected analytically, and the selection of Profile 2 produced less jitter than the base-
line. The DID data behaved as expected and provided critical data for understanding interactions 
and determining operations and constraints. MMC corrections were tweaked to provide dramatic 
reduction in pointing error. The INR approach worked as designed and was flexible enough to 
accommodate additional corrections. Interactions with the ES galvanometer near 100 Hz, and 
instrument structure from near 80 Hz to 100 Hz, were identified on the ground and wheel speed 
ranges reduced in order to avoid DI and jitter. Lingering concerns that Sounder steps would lead 
to unacceptable Imager pointing error were not realized, and both instruments were operated sim-
ultaneously. ES single/dual chord operation was identified prior to launch and should have been 
better mitigated operationally. Unexpected spacecraft modes, not fully identified by analysis, 
showed up on-orbit, but it was possible to avoid exciting them. General lessons learned follow for 
the “Provide Operational Flexibility & Constrain Operationally” element:  
 Exercising key component/subsystem operational flexibilities (SADA step modes, cryocooler 
drive frequency, component redundancy, adjustable correction profiles, etc.) and constraints 
(wheel speeds, simultaneous operations, etc.) requires diagnostic instrumentation to improve 
pointing stability/jitter performance on-orbit; 
 Operational flexibilities are needed to avoid non-rigid dynamic interaction with flexible 
modes of spacecraft appendages, which can be difficult to fully identify prior to launch, as 
well as with high-Q modes internal to instruments and ACS sensors. 
Architectural Choice 
Was the right system architected? Yes and No is the answer to that question. The observatory 
configuration was driven by the desire to leverage off the geosynchronous communications indus-
try, and the INR system design was from the start constrained by that configuration. In retrospect, 
we can clearly see that the ES was the wrong choice for this mission and led to numerous prob-
lems. Although the GOES I-M INR approach and methodology worked and eventually performed 
acceptably, initial performance to the original baseline (24-hour IMC correction cycle) was poor. 
The ability to track stars and landmarks with the instruments worked and laid the necessary foun-
dation for the INR system to successfully compensate for planned orbit and attitude errors and 
correct image motion errors at the source (i.e., the scan mirror) so that the apparent pixel shift due 
to these effects was compensated for in near real-time. The INR system was flexible and robust 
enough to allow for more ES-specific, and more frequent (5 SSAAs per day), IMC corrections; 
and the instrument servos were robust enough to track larger and more dynamic corrections. Ac-
ceptable performance was achieved, but at the expense of operational cost, complexity, and re-
duced instrument imaging time duty cycle. In addition, unexpected thermal transient behavior 
during eclipse season also challenged INR requirements. The overall GOES I-M approach for 
understanding and minimizing pointing error and jitter worked well. General lessons learned fol-
low regarding the architecture: 
 Given inherent ACS ground test limitations, key components must be properly selected 
(based on proven capability) and fully characterized (through test/analysis) for use in a high-
fidelity control system model; 
 On-orbit flexibilities to improve pointing stability and minimize jitter require on-orbit instru-
mentation for diagnostics, diagnostics which could potentially save a mission; 
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 A belt-and-suspenders architecture (quiet moving mechanisms, system isolation, and robust 
disturbance correction schemes including active control) should be applied for missions with 
tight pointing stability/jitter requirements; 
 Applying deterministic orbital and attitude pointing corrections to the instrument scan mirror 
is broadly applicable to a range of architectures, but the magnitude of needed correction 
should be minimized and the stability duration shown to be conservative; 
- Instruments and ACS sensors should be co-located, thermally isolated to reduce relative LoS 
error, and dynamically isolated to reduce dynamic interaction. 
Test and Analysis Balance 
Was it the right combination of test and analysis for pointing and jitter? There were some es-
capes but overall, the project ran a strong system test program aimed at identifying dynamic in-
teractions at instrument and observatory levels, and demonstrating INR performance. The flight 
DID/ADS data set was used in the test program at different levels of assembly, instrument, and 
observatory, eliminating trend performance variations due to instrumentation. There were some 
unexpected performance variations as a function of system integration and boundary conditions. 
Early dynamics and DI testing led to needed design changes. The WFC system test was invalua-
ble, as the observatory was suspended/isolated, all disturbance sources were operated while in-
strument image data were collected with targets illuminating the whole aperture. However, there 
was no comprehensive ES test program to feed a high-fidelity ACS or jitter simulation. A limited 
end-to-end pointing stability/jitter analysis supported a piecewise understanding of dynamics and 
susceptibilities, but some pieces were missing. A better system jitter analysis might have been 
beneficial, but would not have been adequate without high-fidelity ES performance data. There 
were also some critical analysis shortcomings in areas where testing was impractical: specifically 
STOP analysis of the instruments did not predict daily LoS deviations during eclipse; thermal 
analysis did not predict transients due to boom shadowing; structural analysis did not properly 
identify all flexible structures; and ACS analysis of ES performance did not predict resulting 
pointing errors due to ES noise and non-linearities. General lessons learned follow regarding the 
test/analysis mix: 
 Early tests, particularly for key components/subsystems that affect pointing stability, allow 
for design tweaks; 
 Incremental testing, with different boundary conditions, at increasingly higher levels of fideli-
ty are important to understand test configuration effects; 
 There are multiple ways to verify system pointing stability/jitter performance, but for com-
plex systems with tight requirements, a thorough incremental test program is required to an-
chor even the best analysis, and a systems dynamic interaction test is required (at minimum) 
as a sanity check; 
 These suggested minimal requirements for verifying pointing stability/jitter performance are 
recommended even for designs/approaches that have previously worked, to cover build-to-
build variations; 
 Simulated interfaces and disturbance sources can be used for early pointing stability/jitter 
sensitivity characterization, but actual system performance is highly dependent on flight in-
terface fidelity and boundary conditions, and available hardware (e.g., slip tables) for dynam-
ics test are often not suitable for low disturbance; 
 Systems performance sanity checks should be performed at the highest level of integration 
possible, running actual disturbance sources while checking performance at the instruments; 
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 Wheel spin-up tests offer an ideal opportunity to understand dynamic interaction, as they 
provide enough energy to interrogate the system and generate transfer functions; 
 Spot-check tests and on-orbit operational flexibility is needed around areas of higher uncer-
tainty, that cannot be fully tested/analyzed on the ground, including: transient thermal effects, 
flexible appendages, hi-Q modes, micro-radian level interaction, and stray light; 
 “Garbage-In, Garbage-Out” can be mitigated by “Engineers Need Data Too” recognition and 
action, and model uncertainty factors must be directly tied to test fidelity. 
Broader Context of GOES Program Evolution 
Figure 6 and Figure 7 are illustrative of the broader conceptual picture of the GOES Program 
evolution in the INR, pointing, and jitter areas. The two figures identify some key system changes 
that the authors believe enabled significant improvements in INR performance over the decades 
since the GOES I-M series spacecraft first went into operation. ACS pointing accuracy and stabil-
ity were dramatically improved in the GOES N-P spacecraft by the moving away from the ES-
based momentum-bias attitude control approach to a Stellar-Inertial based ACS. One can also see 
that the ACS bandwidth, which is a direct indicator of the spacecraft’s rigid body control perfor-
mance, was decreased over time, dropping from 0.08 Hz on the GOES I-M series spacecraft to 
0.018 Hz on the GOES N-P series spacecraft and then eventually to 0.03 Hz on the GOES R-U 
series spacecraft. The actual measureable impact on jitter mitigation of reducing the ACS band-
width on the GOES spacecraft is not obvious, with bandwidth typically set as high as practicable 
given spacecraft flexible body modes. In fact, this raises an important architectural question re-
garding how high the ACS bandwidth should be set on a spacecraft such as GOES, which utilizes 
multiple levels of jitter control and isolation. Where in the frequency domain is the so-called 
“sweet spot” for setting the ACS bandwidth (in the presence of an instrument pointing control 
system)? Prior sensitivity studies for precision space telescopes with fast steering mirrors have 
studied this very question and have found relatively little impact of ACS bandwidth on high-
frequency jitter performance.8 Clearly, as mentioned in Reference 8, it is important and necessary 
to assess the aggregate jitter performance since all the various controllers on-board the spacecraft 
have some influence on the resultant instrument LoS jitter. 
It is also very evident that both component-level and subsystem-level performance have also 
been proactively improved over time, including: closing local speed control loops around RWs; 
improving orbital determination and navigation with Global Positioning System (GPS); increas-
ing the payload’s operational duty cycle moving towards satisfying “operate through” require-
ments with Low Thrust Reaction Engine Assembly;9 and reducing platform disturbances with 
quieter mechanisms (SADAs, RWs, etc.). These, and other changes to improve thermal stability, 
led to reduced magnitudes of instrument scanner servo correction. We see a trend towards more 
robust control of pointing errors at the scanner both from the use of deterministic feed-forward 
correction and higher bandwidth active compensation, as well as from higher bandwidth instru-
ment servo control systems. Design changes meant fewer corrections were required for instru-
ment design/build errors (e.g., separate scan axes were used to reduce orthogonality errors). As 
the GOES spacecraft evolved there is a move towards applying more passive isolation, both at the 
RWs and at a deployable payload bench. Better thermal stability was achieved by eliminating 
shadowing effects, and improving instrument thermal isolation and stable co-location. Jitter was 
handled in an interface specification driven approach, with performance margins built-in. On the 
GOES R-U series, the objective of significantly improved jitter modelling was aggressively pur-
sued, over a much higher frequency range in fact. The current modern set of high-fidelity dynam-
ic modeling tools, which were not available to the GOES I-M team decades ago, obviously have 
facilitated the current improved modeling work. This modeling capability allowed for the pro-
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gram to shift from the initial GOES I-M heavy reliance on system testing to the current GOES R-
U reliance on modeling (anchored by component and subsystem testing) for system-level verifi-
cation. The overall jitter approach evolved to be more consistent with a “robustness philosophy,” 
with architecture belts and suspenders, and conservative modelling based on specifications (not 
expected performance). 
Location of ACS sensor / Instruments, 
correction for Co-location pointing errors
Orbital effects / ACS pointing errors (at/below 
ACS BW)
Jitter environment / mitigation approach (at/above ACS BW) 
GOES 
I-M
ES and Instruments mounted on Nadir facing 
deck, not thermally or dynamically isolated
/
Large IMC correction for thermal based on star 
tracking and landmarking with instruments
Large IMC correction for inclination (.5° box)
Large corrections needed for ES stray light, and 
chord issues
/
Large ACS control errors due to ES noise
Instrument scan induced rigid body motion  of SC
Disturbances from MW and SADA operation, instrument BB scan, etc.
Large ACS (.08 Hz BW) control errors due to ES noise, effectively platform disturbance
/
Quiet wheels, selectable SADA profile
Avoid interactions (e.g. constrain MW speed)
MMC FF for instrument scan induced rigid body motion of SC
GOES 
N-P
Stellar/Inertial sensors and Instruments 
mounted on optical bench that is on flexures
/
Medium IMC correction for thermal based on 
star tracking and landmarking with 
instruments, as bench is less distorted
Large IMC correction for inclination (.5° box)
/
Instrument scan induced rigid body motion  of SC
Disturbances from MW and SADA operation, instrument BB scan, etc.
/
Quiet RWs, Quiet SADA, 8 selectable profiles called stutter stepping
No MMC but active DMC (3Hz BW)
Reduced ACS (.018-.033 Hz) BW, better jitter stability
GOES 
R-U
Stellar/Inertial sensors and Instruments 
mounted on optical bench that is passively 
isolated from bus with Instruments thermally 
isolated
/
Low IMC correction for thermal based on star 
tracking and landmarking with new ABI 
instrument that is thermally isolated on flexure 
mounted bench
Small OMC correction for inclination (.1° box)
GPS aids orbital correction
/
Sets correct scan line end points in real time, does 
rest of correction by resampling* on ground in near 
real time
Disturbances from MW and SADA operation, instrument BB scan, etc.
/
Quiet RWs, Quiet SADA (zero backlash harmonic drive, 2 phase brushless DC)
EPP passive isolation above 5Hz, RW isolation above 50Hz, AVD up to 2Hz
**Scan motion and thruster FF
Active SMC (100 Hz data), higher BW ABI scan loops >60 Hz
Reduced ACS (.03 Hz) BW, better jitter stability
-Better Co-Location Thermal Stability      
-Reduced Bench Mechanical Distortion
and Disturbance Isolation
-More active control of wider range of disturbances at instrument
-Similar diagnostic instrumentation systems except GOES-N uses ATA angular rate 
sensor, GOES-R+ uses DIRA
**collecting ABI data during HK required
GOES Program INR Improvements
-Reduced Orbital Effects (smaller inclination box)
-Better Orbit Determination
-Better ACS Sensor Performance (Nav, Reg)
*resampling required for large ABI FPA  
Figure 6. GOES Program Evolution, Architecture. 
GOES Program INR Improvements, snapshot
Parameter GOES-I-M GOES-N-P GOES-R
Navigation Performance
112 µrad (day)*
*With numerous 
unplanned corrections and 
SSAAs
Corrections at Servo
• IMC up to 1550 µrad
• Thermal > 600 µrad
• ES S-Light  >1000 µrad
• ES chord >800 µrad
• Five SSAAs/day
Performance
65 µrad
2X better getting rid of 
ES, more stable bench
Corrections at Servo
• IMC up to 1550 µrad
• Thermal < 600 µrad?? 
Same instruments but 
better mount
• SIAD instead of ES
Performance
28 µrad 
Another 2X better with 
GPS and  smaller 
inclination box
Corrections at Servo
• IMC up to 290 µrad as 
inclination box shrank 
from .5  to .1 deg
• Thermal LOS ABI ??
• SIAD and GPS
Registration
Frame-to-Frame
over 15 minutes
over 90 minutes
Performance
50 µrad (day)
84 µrad (day)
Corrections at Servo
• MMC 70 µrad
• Residual MMC 4µrad
• Residual ACS stability 
due to ES noise 10-20 
µrad
Performance
36 µrad
49 µrad
1.5X better with better 
ACS performance and 
active jitter control
Corrections at Servo
• DMC active to 3 Hz to 
correct scanner induced 
(and other) rigid body 
bus motion >70 µrad
• Residual ACS stability 2 
µrad
Performance
21 µrad
21 µrad
Another 2X better with 
new instrument (ABI), 
more vibration 
suppression/ isolation, 
better active jitter control
Corrections at Servo
• SMC active to 60 Hz to 
correct scanner induced 
(and other) rigid body 
bus motion >70? µrad
• FF corrections for BB 
slew and thrusters >70? 
µrad
All requirements are 3σ (99.7%) and apply to both East-West (EW) and North-South (NS)  
Figure 7. GOES Program Evolution, Performance. 
Moreover, in general, it should be noted that the technology and the performance of INR sys-
tems has evolved considerably since their first use on the GOES I-M Program.10 This reference is 
a historical look back at the INR field written by one of the original INR developers. The INR 
concept has found multiple applications on both U.S. and non-U.S. (e.g., the European Meteosat 
Third Generation Program) geosynchronous meteorological spacecraft systems since its inception 
on GOES I-M.  
 19 
CONCLUSION 
The GOES I-M Program was groundbreaking in many ways. Constrained to leverage a herit-
age geosynchronous communications spacecraft bus while tasked with meeting stringent INR 
requirements, the NASA-NOAA-SS/L team used a multi-layered approach to meet stringent in-
strument LoS pointing and pointing stability requirements. Verification was heavily biased to-
wards understanding performance through test, and using that knowledge towards correcting or 
avoiding pointing errors. Lessons learned that emerged from the GOES I-M experience were pre-
sented, consistent with this approach, and framed to architectural and test/analysis choices.  
ACRONYMS 
ABI Advanced Baseline Imager 
ACS Attitude Control System 
ADS Angular Displacement Sensor 
AFT Amplitude, Frequency, Time 
BB Black Body 
BW Bandwidth 
CONUS CONtiguous United States  
DI Dynamic Interaction   
DID Dynamic Interaction Diagnostic  
DIRA Digital Integrating Rate Assembly 
DMC Dynamic Motion Control 
E/W East/West 
ES Earth Sensor 
FF Frame-to-Frame 
FFR Frame-to-Frame Registration 
FPA Focal Plane Assembly 
FPE Fixed Pattern Errors  
GN&C Guidance, Navigation, and Control 
GOES Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite  
GPS Global Positioning System 
IMC Image Motion Compensation  
INR Image Navigation and Registration 
INSAT Indian National Satellite System 
LoS Line of Sight 
MDL Multiuse Data Link 
MMC Mirror Motion Compensation 
MW Momentum Wheel 
MWC Multi Wedge Collimator 
N/S North/South 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NESC NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
OATS Orbit & Attitude Tracking System 
PROM Programmable Read Only Memory 
RPM Revolutions per Minute 
RW Reaction Wheel 
SA Solar Array 
SADA Solar Array Drive Assembly 
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SC Spacecraft 
SIAD Stellar Inertial Attitude Determination 
SMC Scan Motion Control 
SS/L Space Systems Loral 
SSAA Short Span Attitude Adjustment 
STOP Structures-Thermal-Optical-Power 
TDT Technical Discipline Team 
TVAC Thermal Vacuum 
WFC Wide Field Collimator 
WIFR With-In-Frame Registration 
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